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Money on the Table?.
Responding to Cross-Border Tax Arbitrage
Daniel Shaviro*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the international taxation literature, one cannot so much as scan an opening
paragraph without substantial danger of "learning" once again that we live in an age of
globalization, worldwide capital mobility, increasing inter-dependency, and (with
suitable drumroll) threats to national sovereignty. Tedium aside, however, these
claims have the virtue, at least-except for the last of them-of being unmistakably
true.

Why isn't national sovereignty endangered (or at least not unmistakably so) by
global economic integration? If one defines it as national autarky, then presumably it is
endangered-if only because, as the people of North Korea and Myanmar might
attest, the global trends make autarky ever more unappealing. Suppose, however, that
one instead defines sovereignty in a conventional international law sense, as embracing
political independence, territorial integrity, exclusive jurisdiction over one's territory
and residents, and freedom from intervention by foreign sovereigns. Then the fact
that countries have ever more extensive strategic interactions and ability to affect each
other is not a violation of sovereignty; rather, it is part of the context in which they
exercise sovereignty. Even if countries have less latitude to make policy in disregard of
outside competitive pressures or emerging worldwide uniformities, this might be
viewed as merely influencing how they may choose to exercise their sovereignty.
Still, a debate about global economic trends in relation to sovereignty is too
semantic to hold much ultimate interest. A more rewarding topic is how the trends
affect countries' strategic interactions. Harmonization and competition are two wellknown modes of interaction between countries' legal systems, sometimes viewed as
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polar opposites, but often overlapping. For example, a race to the bottom may involve
effective harmonization through competition.
In evaluating the consequences of countries' strategic interactions, two key norms
to keep in mind are national welfare and worldwide welfare. When the two norms
offer consistent counsel, countries may find it easy to achieve mutual gain through
cooperation. Even when the two norms seem to conflict, they can, in theory, be
reconciled through policies that aim at maximizing worldwide welfare, but offer
compensation to the losers. However, this Coase Theorem truism is subject to the
usual problem of transaction costs, such as those with the underlying prisoner's
dilemmas, where cooperation is best for the group but not for anyone acting in
isolation. National and worldwide welfare also may be pushed apart by bargaining
problems in a bilateral monopoly, wherein each actor seeks to capture as much as
possible of the surplus that is available through cooperation, even at the risk of
destroying it all.
International income taxation provides a good illustration of how national and
worldwide welfare may interrelate in practice. Countries frequently tax income on
both a source and a residence basis, reflecting their power and accepted legal
jurisdiction both in personam and in rem. Given these dual claims, if an American
invests in France or vice versa, both countries may feel entitled to tax the same income
at their full statutory rates. However, such a "double tax" may lead to inefficient
deterrence of cross-border investment, to the detriment of the government and people
of both countries.
Coordination of the two countries' tax claims may help mitigate this result.
Countries around the world have therefore agreed, through a web of bilateral treaties,
to coordinate their competing claims via "source country priority." Many countries,
including the United States, do this by offering foreign tax credits that effectively
rebate the tax on what they deem to be foreign source income, to the extent not in
excess of the domestic tax on such income. 2
Implicit in the allowance of foreign tax credits is the view that other countries'
taxes on the outbound investments of one's residents are relevant to one's own policy
choice regarding taxation of these investments. Unilaterally granting foreign tax
credits is generally not in a country's short-term self-interest, since, by fully
reimbursing foreign taxes up to the credit limit, it invites residents to be indifferent to
foreign taxes and foreign governments to impose "soak-up" taxes on inbound
investment. Mitigating double taxation through foreign tax credits is therefore quite
different from favoring free trade, which generally increases national welfare, even if
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done unilaterally.3 However, reciprocal allowance of foreign tax credits, even if well
short of an ideal coordination technique, may leave both cooperating countries better
off than would unmitigated double taxation. A country may, therefore, promote both
national and worldwide welfare (at least, relative to doing nothing) when it grants
foreign tax credits with the understanding that other countries are reciprocating but
would likely play tit-for-tat if it reneged.
Tax policy debate in the United States frequently ignores or misconceives the
relevance to both worldwide and national welfare of interactions between our tax rules
and those of other countries.4 This has been particularly apparent in the ongoing
debate concerning what are known as "cross-border tax arbitrage" transactions. The
United States Treasury has proposed to deny American tax benefits to taxpayers
engaging in these transactions, provoking vehement opposition from taxpayers who
would be adversely affected! Unfortunately, the debate has too often failed to focus
adequately on national and worldwide welfare considerations. This paper therefore
briefly examines cross-border tax arbitrage, in light of these considerations as affected
by countries' strategic interactions.
II. WHAT IS CROSS-BORDER TAX ARBITRAGE?

Cross-border tax arbitrage has been defined as taking advantage of
inconsistencies between different countries' tax rules to achieve a more favorable result
than that which would have resulted from investing in a single jurisdiction.6 Without
delving too deeply into technical minutiae, two relatively simple examples may help
those who are not tax specialists to grasp the underlying idea.
Dual resident companies ("DRCs"). Countries typically apply residence taxation not
just to individuals who are citizens or live inside their borders, but also to certain legal
entities such as corporations. Yet the residence of a corporation is often not obvious
or self-defining. Suppose, for example, that a company is incorporated in country A,
has its main headquarters in country B, operates factories in countries C, D, and E,
and sells its products through sales outlets that it maintains in all five of these
countries plus twenty more. Where is it a resident? The United States determines
3.
4.
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corporate residence based on where a given company is incorporated. The United
Kingdom, by contrast, is among the countries that treat a company as a resident if it is
deemed to be locally managed and controlled. A corporation can therefore qualify as
both a US and a UK resident, if it is incorporated in the US but managed and
controlled (at least for UK tax purposes) in the UK.
One further important detail is that in both countries a group of commonly
owned resident corporations can file a consolidated return, resulting for some
purposes in treatment of the group as if it were a single corporate taxpayer.7 Thus, one
member's losses can be deducted against another's income. Fertile minds soon realized
that this shared rule, in combination with the disparity between the two countries'
corporate residence rules, could be exploited to the taxpayer's advantage.
Suppose that a multinational enterprise incorporates a company in the US and
places its headquarters in the UK, thus making it a DRC that both countries treat as a
"native." The DRC can be consolidated with both the enterprise's UK entities in the
UK and its US entities in the US. Suppose further that both consolidated groups
have positive taxable income, but that the DRC incurs tax losses. (This can be
arranged through such means as making it highly leveraged and manipulating the
reported "transfer prices" on its transactions with other group members.) If otherwise
permitted by both countries, the DRC's tax losses can be deducted twice, against the
income of both the UK and US groups. The result of this double deduction is that an
amount of the overall worldwide group's income equal to the DRC's loss is taxed
nowhere, at least for the present.
The United States responded to this gambit in 1986 by enacting a rule that
denied the use of DRC losses on consolidated returns!s Some years later, the UK
followed suit with a similar rule, although several other countries that apply a
headquarters rule for corporate residence have not done so.9 At present, therefore, the
tax losses of DRCs are not allowable against consolidated group income either in the
US or the UK.
Double-dip leases. A similar tax planning idea takes advantage of disparities
between countries' rules for determining who receives depreciation deductions.
Suppose that legal title to an airplane is held by a French taxpayer, but beneficial
economic ownership goes to an American taxpayer under a long-term lease. France
and the United States agree that depreciation deductions go only to the owner of the
7.
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Strictly speaking, consolidation is the US approach, whereas the UK permits losses to be
surrendered by one member of the resident group to another. For present purposes, however, the
two approaches are effectively the same.
26 USC § 1503(d) (2002).
See David R. Hardy, A Company Without a Country: The Dual ConsolidatedLoss Regime, 84 Tax Notes
747, 756 (1999) (providing overview of systems in the UK, Australia, the Netherlands, and
Germany). The UK rule excludes dual resident companies from the UK consolidated group, rather
than specifically addressing losses like the US rule.
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property, as defined for tax purposes. However, France bases tax ownership
exclusively on legal title, while United States tax law sometimes relies on indicia of
economic ownership.
Thus, with careful planning, the airplane's acquisition cost may end up being
deducted in full by both the legal owner in France and the beneficial owner in the
United States. This may result in worldwide non-taxation, at least for a while, of an
amount equal to the acquisition cost. Despite the similarity to the result of creating a
DRC with tax losses, double-dip leases, while widely noted, have not been challenged
even by the (at times assertive) United States Treasury.
III. ARE THESE REALLY ARBITRAGES, AND DOES IT MATTER?
Are these transactions really arbitrages? As with "sovereignty" in relation to
globalization, that depends on how one defines the term. Economists define arbitrage
as costlessly buying and selling, or borrowing and lending, the same item at different
prices so that one is guaranteed a positive payoff. An arbitrage opportunity therefore
provides the equivalent of a risk-free "money pump" for as long as it lasts."0 The idea
that arbitrage is impossible at equilibrium has been called "the one concept that unifies
all of finance."'
Dual resident companies and double-dip leases are not arbitrages in this sense.
They involve a net investment position that happens to receive favorable tax treatment
taking into account all countries' tax systems, rather than an offset between positions.
Markets do not eliminate them, but rather encourage their continued creation until
the point where the marginal tax benefit is no longer worth the marginal non-tax cost.
Anyone who is accustomed to the standard economic usage of "arbitrage" may
therefore find its application here metaphorical at best, and misleading at worst.
Even if the transactions are not strictly arbitrages, however, might they fall
within the common usage of "tax arbitrage"? In the tax policy literature, this term is
commonly used to describe offsetting long and short positions that are taxed
asymmetrically-for example, by pairing an excluded or deferred gain with a currently
deductible loss. 2 An example would be borrowing to own a home, and thereby
generating excludable imputed rental income along with deductible home mortgage
interest expense. This usage of the term "tax arbitrage" is convenient, even though it
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12.

Philip H. Dybvig and Stephen A. Ross, Arbitrage, in Peter Newman, Murray Milgate, and John
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applies to real net positions that markets do not eliminate," because the technique it
describes (while consistent with equilibrium) is important to tax planning and
government responses thereto.
Dual resident companies and double-dip leases are not tax arbitrages, however,
for the same reason that they are not strict economic arbitrages. Again, they involve a
single position, rather than a pair of asymmetrically taxed long and short positions.
One might be able to use them in constructing a tax arbitrage, but this merely reflects
that their worldwide tax treatment is favorable. Similarly, the income exclusion for a
home's imputed rental value is not itself a tax arbitrage but can be used in constructing
one.
Why, then, would anyone use the term "cross-border tax arbitrage" to describe
the transactions? To some extent, it may be a rhetorical ploy to cast the transactions,
like tax arbitrage in some of the tax policy literature, in an unfavorable light. The only
way to defend it semantically would be to say that the taxpayer is "arbitraging" the
inconsistencies between two countries' legal rules.
There is nothing inherently wrong with using the term this way if one likes. It is,
after all, just a semantic issue. And perhaps the salience of giving the name "arbitrage"
to these instances of clever legal jujitsu is worth the risk of confusion. Yet one should
understand that the sense of semantic inconsistency that underlies this explanation of
the term bears little relationship to the reasons why we might be concerned, from a
national or worldwide welfare standpoint, about the transactions that are being
described.
From such a standpoint, the main reason for concern about cross-border tax
arbitrages (to abandon further quibbling about the name, simply because it has gained
such wide acceptance) is that they involve preferential worldwide tax treatment.
Taxpayers who use DRCs or double-dip leases are effectively taxed nowhere on
certain worldwide income. The resulting planning opportunities may have undesirable
effects on taxpayer behavior and worldwide resource allocation because they violate
tax neutrality, a norm that, in some circumstances, promotes efficiency. So, crossborder tax arbitrages are potentially undesirable for the same reasons as singlejurisdiction tax preferences, although their cross-border character may complicate the
national welfare analysis.
As compared with tax preferences generally, cross-border tax arbitrages'
distinctive feature is their involving what one might call "cross-border tax synergy," or
an interaction between two tax systems to achieve favorable results that neither system
would have offered standing alone. Once we identify the issue this way, we can see
that "arbitrage" in the metaphorical sense of exploiting inconsistencies in the
13.

Steuerle, Taxes, Loans, and Inflation at 59-60 (cited in note 12), using the terms "pure tax arbitrage"
to describe arbitrages in the strict economic sense that are created by asymmetric tax treatment, and
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application of a shared legal concept, such as corporate residence or tax ownership, is
just a means rather than the end of ultimate interest. Semantic inconsistency is neither
necessary nor sufficient to achieving cross-border tax synergy,'4 and the inquiry into
whether it exists in a given case may be unilluminating. Suppose, for example, that the
UK had the same corporate residence rule as the US, but offered tax benefits to
foreign corporations with local headquarters. If the end result were the same as that
from being able to claim double deductions by exploiting inconsistent corporate
residence rules, it should not matter whether we still regarded this as involving an
"arbitrage" between inconsistent applications of the same tax concept.
In practice, developed countries' tax systems are similar enough that cross-border
tax synergies often involve exploiting inconsistent definitions of a single term of art.'
Thus, looking for cross-border tax arbitrages might be a good strategy for identifying
cross-border tax synergies that may be of interest. Yet we should keep in mind that
semantic inconsistency is not inherently something to be concerned about. Taxpayers
are not being sneaky or dishonest when they find a clever way to steer through
different countries' tax rules; there is no moral duty of worldwide semantic
consistency. At the same time, the fact that one can engage in these transactions
without shame, if the rules permit them, tells us nothing about whether the rules
should permit them.
IV.

WELFARE IMPLICATIONS OF ADDRESSING CROSS-BORDER TAX
ARBITRAGES

A. ARE THEY RELEVANT TO NATIONAL TAX POLICY?
Discussions of cross-border tax arbitrages often start from a presumption that
tax benefits from the transactions must be allowed unless tax officials can identify a
'legitimate objection." 6 Or we are told that the transactions cannot properly be
addressed unless they are demonstrably worse than others that remain permissible' 7seemingly an open invitation to treat the worst as the enemy of addressing the merely
bad. We also are asked why, in evaluating the US tax treatment, say, of taxpayers with

14.

15.

16.
17.

An example of cross-border tax synergy without the "arbitrage' is merging companies in high-tax
and low-tax countries in order to shift taxable income to the low-tax country without having to
move economic activity there. An example of the legal arbitrage without the synergy is the use of a
DRC where the consolidated group cannot use the losses in one of the countries.
There also are negative cross-border tax synergies resulting from such inconsistencies that are to the
taxpayer's detriment. A prominent example concerns the treatment of interest expense incurred by
US multinationals. See Shaviro, 54 Tax L Rev at 376-77 (cited in note 4).
West, 3 Fla Tax Rev at 171 (cited in note 6).
Rosenbloom, 53 Tax L Rev at 148 (cited in note 6).
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German double-dip leases, we should "be concerned
about the rate of tax they are
Is
called upon to pay on rental income in Berlin."
The question is an easy one. The reason we should care about the German tax
treatment of a transaction involving American taxpayers is that it may affect us. Other
countries' tax rules may influence our taxpayers' incentives. Such rules are therefore
likely to affect the investments that Americans make and the resources that they
spend on tax planning. Their pre-tax and after-tax income may be affected by foreign
tax rules, and so may our tax collections. Effects of this sort are normally considered to
lie well within a government's reasonable areas of concern.
The foreign tax treatment of a given transaction involving one's own taxpayers is
merely a factual input, like any other, to the question of how the different rules that
one might select would affect national welfare. Indeed, the only difference that comes
to mind between this input and any other is that this one may tend, albeit not
uniquely, to raise issues of strategic interaction between different countries. For
example, if the Germans notice that we are expressly responding to their tax rules,
then perhaps they will become more likely to respond, in turn, to ours. Such strategic
interactions are always relevant to the consequences of adopting a given policy, and
accordingly should be taken into account here, just as in any other setting.
For analytical convenience, however, I start my evaluation of cross-border tax
arbitrages from a national welfare standpoint by assuming that the United States
response to a given cross-border tax arbitrage is entirely unilateral, in the sense of not
affecting other countries' decisions. I then turn to issues of strategic interaction.
B. UNILATERAL RESPONSES TO CROSS-BORDER TAX ARBITRAGE
(AND OTHER CROSS-BORDER TAX SYNERGIES)

A good starting point in evaluating the United States tax issues raised by doubledip leases and DRCs is to ask why we allow income tax deductions, such as for
depreciation or a consolidated group member's losses, in the first place. The fact that
allowing these deductions may improve the accuracy with which the tax system
measures net income is merely a means. The end, presumably, is to improve the
efficiency and distributional consequences of our income tax, and government rules
generally, relative to the case where the deductions are not allowed. Thus, for
example, suppose there was a proposal to tax supermarkets on their gross sales
receipts, without allowing them to recover costs of goods sold and operating expenses,
while all other businesses continued to be taxed as at present. 9 It seems likely that this
proposal would inefficiently discourage supermarkets relative to other business
18.
19.

Id at 151. For an important exception to the style of analysis that I am criticizing. see Reuven S. AviYonah, Commentary, 53 Tax L Rev 167 (2000).
The distinction between the tax treatment of supermarkets and other undertakings is needed
because they would not be relatively disadvantaged, say, by a comprehensive retail sales tax.
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undertakings.' It also might prompt costly avoidance responses by supermarkets (for
example, purporting to be middlemen that do not actually own the goods they sell,
thereby avoiding the application of the unfavorable tax rules).
Now suppose we learned that, for some odd reason, allowing supermarkets the
same sorts of deductions as any other business would actually reduce efficiency and
equity. Then the case for taxing them on their gross sales receipts might be a good one
after all. Denying them all deductions and other cost recovery would have two
compelling advantages. First, it would, by express hypothesis, directly increase
efficiency and equity. Second, if the gross sales receipts tax on supermarkets raised
revenue, despite any possible Laffer curve effect, and if the government had fixed
revenue goals, then adoption of this tax would reduce the need to induce further
economic distortion by levying higher taxes in some other setting.
Assuming for now that other countries will not address cross-border tax
arbitrages, this seemingly absurd hypothetical offers a compelling way to look at
DRCs and double-dip leases. Allowing corporate groups to deduct one member's
losses against another's net income and providing cost recovery with respect to
depreciable business assets may generally be good ideas. However, if a foreign
government is kind enough to provide deductions for these items, then why should we
do so as well? Doubling the deductions provides a worldwide tax preference for these
transactions that may increase economic distortion by inducing American taxpayers to
choose investments with inferior pre-tax returns. It may also cost the United States
tax revenues that would end up being replaced through distortive taxes on something
else. Accordingly, just as in the supermarket hypothetical, denying DRC and doubledip lease deductions is potentially a win-win proposition from a policy standpoint.2'
Suppose one disagreed with the specifics of this analysis-believing, for example,
that selectively available double cost recovery for airplanes improves efficiency. That
view would not require disagreement with the national welfare-based framework for
analysis of cross-border tax arbitrages that I advocate here. It would merely suggest
applying the framework in a given case to reach a different conclusion.
My analysis also should not be interpreted as suggesting that cross-border tax
arbitrages should generally be disallowed, even in the purely unilateral setting where
there are no strategic interactions with other countries. Just like the evaluation of tax
benefits in the purely domestic setting, the issue calls for a case-by-case analysis.
Suppose, for example, that a particular cross-border tax arbitrage serves mainly to
20.

21.

The proposals distributional effects would depend on how it affected pre-tax returns. It is plausible
that, as Boris Bittker has put it, all the inequity would be converted into inefficiency by taxpayer exit
from the supermarket business. See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and the Income Tax: Do
MisallocationsDrive Out Inequities?, 16 San Diego L Rev 735 (1979).
The actual rationale for the US rule limiting the use of DRC losses by US consolidated groups, as
stated in the 1986 legislative history, emphasized "competitiveness" rather than the efficiency
concerns that I would find more persuasive.
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mitigate domestic double taxation of corporate income. This might be a laudable
result if one generally favors corporate integration. Finally, I intend no implication
that only positive or pro-taxpayer cross-border tax synergies should be addressed.
Those that are unfavorable to multinational businesses merit evaluation on national
welfare grounds as well, and their imposing a kind of tax penalty relative to purely
domestic activity may frequently count against them.'
In the discussion thus far, I have glossed over just how broadly applicable this
mode of analysis may be. Since it looks exclusively at the national welfare effects of
unilateral deduction denial by the United States, it is not limited to cases of crossborder tax arbitrage. This should come as no surprise, once I have dismissed as merely
semantic the question of whether two countries' legal rules are being inconsistently
"arbitraged" against each other. Indeed, it is not even limited to cases of cross-border
tax synergy. Rather, the set of cases in which the analysis could apply is potentially
close to unlimited.
Suppose, for example, that the UK offers what we consider unduly favorable tax
treatment to the oil industry, or otherwise favors that industry through government
spending or special regulatory exemptions. It is conceivable in such a case, assuming
unilateral action, that the United States could increase national and also worldwide
welfare by providing an income tax penalty that was designed to reverse those undue
UK benefits whenever they were enjoyed by a United States taxpayer.
More generally, one could imagine the United States scouring the world in
search of inefficient subsidies that it was in a position to reverse, to its own national
benefit and perhaps that of the world economy through offsetting income tax (or
other) penalties. Pushed to this extreme, however, one may begin to question whether
such an enterprise might end up proving misguided and counterproductive. In
particular, one might wonder what other countries would think about this course of
action, and how they would respond to it.
The point this makes, however, is simply that unilateral action by the United
States cannot be assumed. Particularly, though not uniquely, if we are making money
by effectively reversing other countries' deliberate economic policies, those countries
might respond by doing things that we would not like. And such a possibility must be
considered even in the case of a cross-border tax arbitrage that likely reflects an
inadvertent interaction resulting from slight differences in tax rules, rather than the
other countrys considered economic policy.
To the extent we can act unilaterally, however, there are likely to be win-win
cases where the United States does well by doing good. That is, we may be able to
raise revenue by reducing inefficiencies in the national and world economies.
Responding to such opportunities-for example, by denying US benefits to DRCs or
22.

Shaviro, 54 Tax L Rev at 404-06 (cited in note 4) (criticizing the negative cross-border tax synergy
arising from differences between United States and foreign rules for "sourcing" interest expense).
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double-dip leases if this would increase national welfare as I tentatively suggestpotentially offers us a result that is even better than free money. Leaving this (better
than) free money on the table, by not responding to cross-border tax arbitrages where
a response is in our national interest, would be foolish.
C. STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES' TAX SYSTEMS

Again, my assumption in the previous section that the United States can act
unilaterally was just an analytically convenient starting point. Other countries are
always capable of responding to what we do. Moreover, when we directly, and perhaps
even explicitly, adopt policies that respond to or rely on their legal rules, they may be
especially likely to pay attention. For example, deliberately offsetting their subsidies
with penalties might lead to retaliation, although in any given case we might
conceivably get away with it or benefit on balance despite the response.
How should we generally expect other countries to respond when we deny US
tax benefits to a multinational enterprise by reason of a cross-border tax arbitrage. No
less than in the subsidy reversal case, this might in practice amount to an open
invitation to the other country to reconsider its rule in light of ours. We have, after all,
raised the subject of the rules' interacting effects, and, in a case like the DRC or
double-dip lease, denied deductions specifically because the other country is or may be
granting them.
There is, however, a significant difference from the case of reversing other
countries' deliberate subsidies. In the double-dip lease example, France presumably is
not aiming to maximize the worldwide tax subsidy to airplanes. Nor is it likely to be
raising the tricolor in support of the proposition that depreciation deductions ought
always to go to legal owners. Its aim, rather, may simply be to implement a net income
concept by allowing depreciation, while defining tax ownership in the manner that it
happens to find convenient administratively. We might not, therefore, be defeating
French policy goals by denying our own depreciation deductions in cases of
duplicative tax ownership. A similar analysis might apply to DRCs, the UK corporate
residence rules, and the UK treatment of consolidated groups.
Suppose that the United States addressed both of these cross-border tax
arbitrages by denying the duplicated deductions, and that for some reason France and
the United Kingdom were entirely unable to change their own rules. Under this
circumstance, both countries might well be grateful to us for stepping in. Deduction
denial by the United States might conceivably induce their own residents to make
better pre-tax investments and spend less money on tax planning. France and the UK
also might conceivably gain revenue if their taxpayers engaged in fewer of these
transactions by reason of the US response.
Now, however, suppose (a lot more reasonably) that France and the UK are
perfectly capable of enacting their own responses to these transactions. Even if they
are sympathetic to the end result of eliminating double deductibility, they may wonder

Fall2002

Chicago.journafof Internationa(Law

why the United States should capture the entire direct fiscal benefit. Why should we
get to freeride on the fact that they were offering deductions that both sides agree
should be taken only once, when they could just as easily freeride on us? They might
further think of us as administrative freeriders, if we conditioned our denial of tax
benefits on findings of corporate residence or tax ownership that were made by their
tax systems.
In sum, by responding unilaterally with deduction denial, the United States
could be viewed as aggressively grabbing nearly all of the available joint surplus from a
bilateral monopoly (involving the welfare gain that the countries can reap by
coordinating their tax rules). Other countries might rationally expect to benefit from
demanding a greater share of the joint surplus, even at the risk of destroying it all.
Threats and chicken games are, after all, a common feature of bargaining over the
division of surplus.
One should not be entirely surprised, therefore, that the UK has enacted its own
duplicative (for US-UK dual corporate residents) response to the DRC problem.23
The potential for double non-deductibility in the case of US-UK dual residents has
begun to prompt taxpayer complaints, although initial efforts to address it through
the treaty process resulted only in an agreement that the two countries' competent
authorities should reach some agreement.'
When both of a DRC's resident countries respond with overlapping deduction
disallowance rules, the distortion may be less than that from double deductibility,
since incurring DRC losses is to some extent elective. Nonetheless, it may amount to
overkill given the possibility of cases where one has business reasons for establishing a
DRC that is making risky investments with the possibility of loss. Even if both the US
and the UK would benefit, no matter what the other country did, from unilaterally
denying the deductions, it is conceivable that they would do better still by
coordinating their rules to allow the deductions a total of once. This might involve
splitting the deductions fifty-fifty, or through any other objective formula, even if
arbitrary.
To date, double-dip leases present the opposite scenario. Neither the United
States nor the foreign countries that base tax ownership rules exclusively on legal title
have thus far sought to claim what is arguably free money on the table by denying
duplicative deductions. So here there may be collective "underkill" rather than overkill.

23.

24.

Germany has also recently enacted a loss disallowance rule for DRCs. However, several other
countries (such as Australia and the Netherlands) that employ a headquarters approach to
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These two examples help to show that achieving desirable coordination between
countries' responses to cross-border tax arbitrage is not all that easy. The problem
may have less to do with ineluctable disagreement between sovereigns, such as
concerning the division ofjoint surplus, than with inattention, competing priorities,
and domestic political considerations.
The US Treasury, for example, might have little inclination to devote its scarce
human resources to coordinating our responses to cross-border tax arbitrages with
those of other countries even if it had the authority to do so. It has faced intense
domestic political opposition even when proposing responses that would give the
United States 100 percent of the direct fiscal benefit. And even if there were more
domestic support in principle to devising joint responses with other countries,
obtaining congressional approval via a treaty or legislation might be quite difficult.
Members of the tax committees in both Houses of Congress often have agendas of
their own. They also have a collective institutional interest in objecting to the use of
the treaty process to implement substantive tax law changes, which involves only the
Senate under the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Yet all this need not deter the United States from responding unilaterally to
cross-border tax arbitrages. Other countries may frequently be slow to act, and
taxpayer self-help through tax planning and the exertion of political pressure may
serve to mitigate instances, like the DRC, of bilateral overkill. Unilateral action should
not be undertaken, of course, in cases where it involves bad policy standing alone. Yet
opportunities to free-ride on other countries' willingness to offer deductions, or to
allow business income to escape their source-based taxes, may often be worth
exploiting, on the ground that they are likely to combine doing well with doing good.
Where unilateral action would not be good policy, this can be argued on the
merits of the particular case, or in more broadly applicable terms. One might argue,
for example, that preventing United States taxpayers from exploiting a given planning
opportunity that is available to foreign investors would in some way disadvantage us.
Or one might argue that, given the arbitrariness and growing avoidability of our
corporate residence rules, there is no point in seeking increased foreign source tax
collections from US corporations. Still another argument might be that, given the
existence of various negative cross-border tax synergies, permitting multinational
businesses to exploit favorable synergies serves on balance to reduce tax distortion.
The great virtue of such arguments is that, whether right or wrong, they address
the right set of issues. They thus would advance a debate that has too often focused
on claims that other countries' tax rules, despite their clear effects on us, are, for some
unstated reason, none of our business.
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V. BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON CROSS-BORDER TAX ARBITRAGE
AND TAX HARMONIZATION

Do the issues raised by cross-border tax arbitrage offer any broader lessons
regarding either the desirability or the feasibility of general tax harmonization? On the
question of desirability, the fact that neither tax harmonization nor tax competition is
always best has been widely recognized. "At that level of generality, one might as well
ask whether government is good or bad."' One rough rule of thumb that may provide
guidance, however, is the view that harmonizing income tax bases often makes sense
even if tax competition with respect to rates is retained or indeed encouraged.'
Eliminating cross-border tax arbitrages resembles tax base harmonization, but
with an important difference. It does not require that different countries actually
adopt the same rules. Thus, suppose France and the United States would have
difficulty in agreeing to the same tax ownership rule, whether out of national pride, or
because they face different administrative tradeoffs, or because changing one's existing
rule would be costly to each country in some way. A rule eliminating duplicative
deductions for double-dip leases, whether adopted unilaterally or bilaterally and no
matter how the revenue were divided, would not require either country to agree which
rule was best, or to depart from its own preferred and settled administrative practice.
Accordingly, some of the arguments against tax base harmonization do not apply to
proposals to move towards elimination of cross-border tax arbitrages.
A broader point concerns how, in this setting and others, international
institutions might be developed to facilitate desirable international cooperation in tax
matters. Some commentators have urged the creation of a "GATT for Taxes" or a
"World Tax Organization," analogous to existing institutions that oversee
international trade.f An admitted problem, however, is the lack of any obvious
reference point akin to free trade. Even among experts, there is no international
consensus regarding such matters as to what sort of tax to levy at the corporate level
and how to relate that tax to the taxation of shareholders.
A multilateral tax organization need not, however, take as its mission the
creation of worldwide tax base uniformity. Instead, it can aim to coordinate
international cooperation where that would be mutually advantageous but is impeded
by transaction costs. Eliminating cross-border tax arbitrages and other tax synergies
25.
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through the reciprocal reduction of duplicated or poorly coordinated tax benefits
would be one possible application. A second, the flip side of this enterprise, might be
reining in countries' occasional inclination to adopt narrow definitions of foreign
source income and thereby to "cheat" at the margin in offering foreign tax credits or
exemption. Furthering international cooperation in tax collection, administration, and
information-gathering might be a third undertaking.
Unilateral action by the United States to deny tax benefits in cases of crossborder tax arbitrage might seem to be a long way from this endpoint. And indeed such
unilateral action mixes the competitive with the cooperative, since, while potentially
aiding other countries that are slow to act, it does so by grabbing the entire direct
fiscal benefit that others might want to share. Yet addressing cross-border tax
arbitrage has at least the potential to help everyone move in the direction of greater
worldwide cooperation, while also possibly advancing purely national ends in the here
and now.
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